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Amicus Curiae ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company
("ChevronTexaco")1 hereby submits this brief in support of the appeal of ExxonMobil
Corporation. The filing of this brief is contingent on the Court granting ChevronTexacofs
motion for leave to file brief of an amicus curiae in accordance with Rule 25, Utah R.
App. P.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This case involves an appeal by ExxonMobil Corporation from the decision of the
Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") in ExxonMobil Corporation v. Auditing
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 00-0901. In that decision, the Tax
Commission ruled that ExxonMobil's oil should be valued at the "point of sale" for
severance tax purposes, whether the sale occurs at the well or downstream from the well.
Record ("R.") at 13. ExxonMobil argues on appeal that its oil should be valued "at the
well," in accordance with Utah Code § 59-5-102(l)(a) (2002), which requires oil and gas
producers to pay to the State of Utah a severance tax "equal to 4% of the value, at the
well, of the oil or gas produced." (Emphasis added.) The positions of ExxonMobil and
the Tax Commission are summarized in the following diagram:

1

ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company was preceded in interest
in the issues relevant to this case by Texaco Exploration and Production Company. For
ease of reference, this brief will refer to the company through all periods as
"ChevronTexaco."
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Separator and Compressor in Gas Field;
Satellite and Battery in Oil Field

Wells
Gathering Lines

ExxonMobil Position:
Always Value Oil
or Gas at the Well

-iid

In the Tax Commission's ExxonMobil decision, two of the four Commissioners
agreed with ExxonMobil and ruled that oil and gas should be valued at the well. R. at
34-39, 296-98. The other two Commissioners, in separate opinions, ruled that oil and gas
should be valued at the "point of sale" (these latter two separate opinions will be referred
to hereinafter as the "Point of Sale Opinions"). R. at 34-39, 288-94. All four
Commissioners then ruled, based on Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-21, that the
taxpayer loses when there is a two-two Tax Commission vote. R. at 36-39. ExxonMobil
accordingly lost its case before the Tax Commission and has appealed to this Court.
Like ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco urges this Court to reverse the Commission
decision. ChevronTexaco has reviewed the amicus brief filed by ConocoPhillips
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Company, and requests the Court to reverse the Tax Commission decision for the reasons
set forth therein. ChevronTexaco also contends that the Tax Commission decision should
be reversed for the following additional reasons.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Point of Sale Opinions Ignore the Plain Language of the Utah Code.
The Point of Sale Opinions suggest it is "reasonable and permissible" to read the

Utah Code as requiring oil and gas to be valued at the point of sale. R. at 291. This
position is in error, as the Utah Code clearly provides that oil and gas must be valued "at
the well." The statutes in issue, with emphasis added, provide as follows:
Oil and gas producers "shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of
the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced."
Utah Code § 59-5-102(l)(a).2
"Value at the wellf means the value of oil or gas at the point production is
completed"
Utah Code §59-5-101(19).
"Well or wells' means any extractive means from which oil or gas is
produced or extracted, located within an oil and gas field, and operated by
one person."
Utah Code §59-5-101(20).
"[T]he value of oil or gas at the well is the value established under an arm's
length contract for the purchase of production at the well, or in the absence

2

Whereas the statutes relevant to this appeal have been unchanged during the
period relevant to the appeal, all cites to the Utah Code herein are to the 2002 version for
ease of reference.
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of such a contract, by the value established in accordance with the first
applicable of the following methods:
(a) the value at the well established under a non-arm's-length contract
for the purchase of production at the well, provided that the value is
equivalent to the value received under comparable arm's-length contracts for
purchases or sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field;
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration of information
relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in the same field or nearby
fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or
other reliable public sources of price or market information;
(c) the value established using the net-back method as defined in Section
59-5-101."
Utah Code §59-5-103(1).
"fNet-back method' means a method of calculating the fair market value of
oil or gas at the well. Under this method, costs of transportation . . . and
processing shall be deducted from any proceeds received for the oil and gas .

Utah Code §59-5-101(7).
"Transportation costs' means the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil
or gas products from the well to the point of sale . . . . "
Utah Code §59-5-101(17).
Based on these statutes, this case turns on where "the well" is, or in other words,
"the point production is completed." Several different authorities indicate that "the well"
means the well, prior to gathering, as advocated by ExxonMobil (see diagram atbove), and
not the point of sale, as advocated by the Tax Commission.
First, the Utah Code itself defines the term "well" to mean "any extractive means
from which oil or gas is produced or extracted." Utah Code § 59-5-101(20) (emphasis
added). In turn, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1981) defines "extract"
as follows: "topull out (as something embedded or otherwise firmly affixed)" and also
#127507
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"to separate (an ore or mineral) from a deposit." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1992) defines "extract" to mean "to remove or take out,
especially by effort or force (anything firmly rooted)" and to "obtain (a natural resource)
from the earth." (Emphasis added.) In addition, Williams & Myers, Oil and Gas Law.
Volume 8, Chapter A (2002) defines "value at the well" to mean "that the oil and gas is to
be valued in its unprocessed state as it comes to the surface at the mouth of the well."
(Emphasis added.) In the case of oil and gas, it is "pulled out" of the ground, "separated"
from the deposit, "removed," "taken out," "obtained from the earth," and brought "to the
surface" at the well prior to gathering (see diagram above), not at the point of sale after
gathering. Oil or gas flowing through gathering lines is not being extracted.
Accordingly, the gathering lines cannot be part of the "well," and the "value at the well"
must be ascertained prior to gathering.
Second, the term "production" has been defined to be completed at the well by
several sources. Most importantly, under the Utah Code, the "point production is
complete" is a definition of "value at the weir under Utah Code § 59-5-101(19)
(emphasis added). The fact that the term "production" is defining the term "well," is a
strong indicator that production is completed at the well.
Moreover, the definition section of the severance tax statutes defines "crude oil" as
hydrocarbons "produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid form." Utah Code §
59-5-101 (8)(a) (emphasis added). It also defines "well" as "any extractive means from
which oil or gas is produced or extracted
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added). If hydrocarbons are already "produced" (in the past tense) at the well/wellhead,
then production is necessarily complete at that point.
As further support that production is complete at the well, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (1981) defines "production" as "bringing out." Oil and gas are
"brought out" when they are extracted from the ground and brought to the surface at the
well. After this extraction has occurred, the oil and gas are simply transported through
gathering lines. No more "producing" takes place. Gathering, transporting, refining,
distributing, and retailing all follow production, as production only occurs once.
Accordingly, production is completed prior to gathering and the value at the well should
be ascertained at that point.
The only known state severance tax case that has looked at the issue of production
ruled in ExxonMobil's favor. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 984 (Wyo.
1996) ("processes necessary for production of gas, for severance and ad valorem tax
purposes, are those necessary to sever or remove the gas from the well" and any processes
"not necessary to remove the gas from the well are post-production expenses").
Cases interpreting the Natural Gas Act also support ExxonMobil's position on
production. See e.g.. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 266 F.2d 208, 211
(5th Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959) ("in the ordinary sense of the terms
[sic] production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground")
(emphasis added); Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 250 F.2d 61, 64
(10th Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958) ("Production of gas is the act of
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bringing forth gas from the earth. Gathering of gas is the act of collecting gas after it has
been brought forth from the earth.").
Federal income tax cases are also supportive. See e.g.. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
v. United States. 449 F.2d 816, 823 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972)
(where the depletable base of taxpayers includes only facilities used in "production,11
holding that a separator in a natural gas field downstream from the well was not part of
the depletable base, because the separator was "not part of production nor necessary
thereto"); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'n. 346 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1965), cert,
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) (holding that absorption and fractionation processes were not
a part of taxpayer's depletable base because they were in "no sense essential to
production").
Oil and gas lease cases and treatises are similarly supportive. See e.g. Harvey E.
Yates Co. v. Powell 98 F.3d 1222,1230-31 (10th Cir. 1996) ("'Production1 has an
established legal meaning when used in a royalty or habendum clause of an oil and gas
lease. 'Production' requires severance of the mineral from the ground") (citing State v.
Pennzoil Co.. 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988)); Pinev Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell
Oil Co.. 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 1984) ("production ends when gas is severed from
the earth"); Martin v. Glass. 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1411 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("the royalty was
based on the value of the gas at the point of production (at the mouth of the well)");
Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co.. 10 P.3d 853, 858 (N.M. App. 2000) ("production costs" are
"expenses incurred in exploring for mineral substances and in bringing them to the
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surface") (quoting Parker v. TO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986));
Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 499 So.2d 210, 213 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (the
wellhead is "the point of production"); Williams & Myers, Oil and Gas Law, Volume 3,
Chapter 6, § 645.2 ("expenses of compressing gas to make it deliverable into a
purchaser's pipeline" are costs "subsequent to production").
Third, the tax at issue is a severance tax, which is defined as a tax imposed on
petroleum and mineral production "at the time they are removed or severed from the
soil." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1374 (6th Ed. 1990); see also Williams and Myers, Oil
and Gas Law, Volume 8, Chapter S (defining severance tax as "a tax on the removal of
minerals from the ground"). Gas is severed from the ground at the well, not downstream.
Based on these authorities and the plain language of the Utah Code, production is
complete at the well, which is the point where oil or gas is severed from the earth.
Accordingly, the Point of Sale Opinions of the Tax Commission, which rule that
production is complete at the point of sale, even if that is downstream from the well,
should be reversed by this Court.
II.

The Point of Sale Opinions Lack Authority, Logic, and Fairness.
In addition to ignoring the plain language of the Utah Code, the Point of Sale

Opinions have crafted a "point of sale" theory that is without authority, logic, or fairness.
First, the Point of Sale Opinions cite to no authority to support their claimed
standard that "production is complete" where the oil or gas is sold. R. at 288-94.
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Second, the Point of Sale Opinions create an illogical severance tax scheme.
While "severance tax" is a "usually regarded as a form of property taxation" (Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 1374 (6th Ed. 1990)), the Point of Sale Opinions convert the severance tax
into a sales tax by imposing the tax wherever the point of sale is. This cannot be correct
under the statutes because the severance tax is imposed on oil or gas that is not sold, but
that is "shipped outside the state," or "stockpiled" for two years. Utah Code §
59-5-102(l)(e) and (f). Moreover, under the "net-back method," the Legislature allows a
deduction for "the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil or gas products from the
well to the point of sale" Id. § 59-5-101(17) (emphasis added). If the severance tax were
imposed at the point of sale, there could never be any transportation deduction, nor any
net-back method. This theory is thus illogical and must be rejected.
Third, the Point of Sale Opinions are unfair because they tax two taxpayers on
different values for the same oil or gas. This violates the Utah Constitution which
requires that "all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. Art.
1, § 24. The Point of Sale Opinions would tax one taxpayer at $8/barrel at the well if that
is the point of sale, and another at $12/barrel downstream if that is the point of sale.3 In
this scenario, the extra $4/barrel is not a tax on oil or gas, it is a tax on the capital
improvements downstream from the well. This is not only unfair, it violates Utah Code
section 59-5-102(l)(a), which provides that the severance tax is imposed on "oil and gas,"
not capital improvements.

3
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Oil can be and is sold both at the well and downstream (R. at 283-84).
9

Lastly, the point of sale analysis raises the issue of whether oil and gas extracted in
Utah, but sold out of state, is taxable in Utah at all. It certainly was not the intent of our
Legislature to allow oil or gas produced in Utah to go untaxed.
For all these reasons, the point of sale theory espoused in the Point of Sale
Opinions should be rejected by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Supreme Court should reverse the decision of
the Tax Commission by holding that: (1) the Point of Sale Opinions are in error; and (2)
oil and gas in Utah must be valued at the well, or in other words, at the point it is
extracted and brought to the surface of the earth, prior to entering the gathering lines.
DATED this 12th day of March, 2003.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

MdJLAd'
Mark K.. Buchi
Steven P. Young
Attorneys for ChevronTexaco Exploration and
Production Company
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